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The ease and extent of recursive mindreading, across implicit and 
explicit tasks 
Abstract 
Recursive mindreading is the ability to embed mental representations inside other mental representations e.g. to hold 
beliefs about beliefs about beliefs. An advanced ability to entertain recursively embedded mental states is consistent 
with evolutionary perspectives that emphasise the importance of sociality and social cognition in human evolution: 
high levels of recursive mindreading are argued to be involved in several distinctive human behaviours and 
institutions, such as communication, religion, and story-telling. However, despite a wealth of research on first-level 
mindreading under the term Theory of Mind, the human ability for recursive mindreading is relatively understudied, 
and existing research on the topic has significant methodological flaws. Here we show experimentally that human 
recursive mindreading abilities are far more advanced than has previously been shown. Specifically, we show that 
humans are able to mindread to at least seven levels of embedding, both explicitly, through linguistic description, 
and implicitly, through observing social interactions. However, our data suggest that mindreading may be easier 
when stimuli are presented implicitly rather than explicitly. We argue that advanced mindreading abilities are to be 
expected in an extremely social species such as our own, where the ability to reason about others’ mental states is an 
essential, ubiquitous and adaptive component of everyday life. 
 
Keywords: mindreading; recursive mindreading; mentalizing; theory of mind; metarepresentation; intentionality; 
evolution; social cognition 
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“Humans have the ability to represent representations… This meta-representational ability is as distinctive of 
humans, and as important in understanding their behaviour, as is echolocation for bats” (Sperber, 1997, p.69) 
 
Introduction 
 Mindreading is the ability to mentally represent others’ mental representations. It is also known as mental 
metarepresentation, or theory of mind. Recursive mindreading is the ability to embed further levels of mental 
representation inside existing mental representations (e.g. I think0 that you believe1 that he thinks2 that she wants3... 
and so on; subscripts count the number of metarepresentations1). An intuitive and commonly held view is that high-
level recursive mindreading (i.e. beyond first or second level) is cognitively demanding, and perhaps beyond normal 
human abilities (e.g. Gómez, 1994; Clark, 1996). Yet theoretical explanations of many important human behaviours 
and institutions, such as communication, religion, story-telling, and culture itself either argue or assume that humans 
can and do process high levels of recursive mindreading routinely and without difficulty (Sperber, 2000a; Dunbar, 
2003; 2008; Tomasello, 2008). Furthermore, our natural ecology is a social one, in which both collaboration and 
competition are everyday activities (Humphrey, 1976; Byrne & Whiten, 1989; Dunbar, 2003). In such an 
environment, the ability to monitor and manage one’s social environment, by reasoning about the motives and 
intentions of others, keeping track of others’ relationships, deciding who to trust, and so on, is of critical importance. 
From this perspective, we should expect humans to be able to process mental (meta)representations with relative 
ease, at least when those representations are encountered within this social ecology. 
There is a large literature on various aspects of first-level mindreading (e.g. the ability to reason about the 
mental state of another: I think0 that you believe1 some proposition) This includes, most prominently, its 
development in children (Wellman et al., 2003; Baillargeon et al., 2010), its role in some social cognitive disorders 
(Baron-Cohen, 1995; Chevallier et al., 2012), and its presence or absence in non-human primates (Premack & 
Woodruff, 1978; Call & Tomasello, 2008). In contrast, there is far less research dealing specifically with recursive 
mindreading, despite its importance for human social life. The handful of studies in adults that do exist report a 
                                                          
1 There is inconsistency in the mindreading literature regarding how to count the levels. Some studies include the 
focal individual’s perspective; others exclude it. This is the difference between counting the number of 
representations (I think1 that Mary thinks2...) or only the number of metarepresentations (I think0 that Mary 
thinks1...). Most adult studies use the former practice, whereas the developmental literature uses the latter. We 
follow this latter practice in this paper. 
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prominent drop in performance after four levels of recursive mindreading (Kinderman et al., 1998; Stiller & Dunbar, 
2007; Lyons et al., 2010). There is also a small literature on second- and third-level tasks in children’s development, 
which finds that the ability to perform these higher-level tasks emerges later in development than competence in 
first-level tasks (see Miller, 2009 for a review). 
 However, previous research on high-order recursive mindreading may have significantly underestimated 
the extent of human recursive mindreading abilities, for at least two reasons. First, the stimuli used in previous 
studies have a number of shortcomings serious enough to raise doubts about their validity. We detail these issues in 
the next section. Second, previous studies tested recursive mindreading ability only explicitly, by presenting stimuli 
either as text to be read, or narration to be heard, and by testing understanding with direct questions, and not 
implicitly, by presenting stimuli as social events to be observed, and testing understanding by measuring reactions to 
those events. It may be the case, especially given the ecological perspective outlined above, that human mindreading 
abilities are fully expressed only when they are employed within social contexts i.e. when encountered implicitly (as 
opposed to being encountered as explicit, disembodied descriptions of those same contexts). This possibility is 
supported by findings in the developmental literature which shows that children pass implicit first-level mindreading 
tasks (false belief tasks) far earlier than they do equivalent explicit tasks: around the first birthday vs. around the 
fourth birthday (see Baillargeon et al., 2010 for a review of implicit false-belief tasks). Precisely what causes this 
dramatic difference is an unresolved issue in Developmental Psychology, but whatever the explanation, these results 
show that the mode of presentation can make a dramatic difference to performance, at least in children. Based on 
this finding, we might expect that adult performance on recursive mindreading tasks could also be facilitated by 
implicit presentation. 
 In sum, recursive mindreading plays an important role in explanations of many major human behaviours, 
yet there are reasons to think that we may not currently know or appreciate the full extent of this ability in adult 
humans. In this paper, we present a new study of recursive mindreading, which has two major advances on previous 
research. First, we use new stimuli designed to avoid the various methodological issues we have identified in 
previous studies (detailed below). Second, we use a 2x2 design of implicitly and explicitly presented stories, crossed 
with implicitly and explicitly presented questions. As such, the key novelty here is the use of implicit stimuli, which 
have not previously been used in the study of recursive mindreading in adults. We expected that, at least in 
conditions featuring implicit presentation, participants would succeed at recursive mindreading tasks at levels higher 
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than those reported in previous studies. Correspondingly, our design includes questions of up to seven levels of 
mental metarepresentation, three levels higher than the typical level of successful performance in previous tasks 
(e.g. Kinderman et al., 1998; Stiller & Dunbar, 2007; Lyons et al., 2010). 
 
Problems with previous research 
Previous studies of recursive mindreading ability used versions of the Imposing Memory Task (IMT)2 (e.g. 
Kinderman et al., 1998; Stiller & Dunbar, 2007; Lyons et al., 2010). The IMT has also been widely used as a 
measure of mindreading ability in studies designed to identify brain regions involved in mindreading (e.g. Powell et 
al., 2010; Lewis et al., 2011), in studies designed to investigate the relationship between mindreading and various 
cognitive disorders (e.g. Frith & Corcoran, 1996; Kerr et al., 2003), and in studies designed to investigate the 
relationship between mindreading ability and other aspects of social psychology, in both adults and children (e.g. 
Liddle & Nettle, 2006; Henzi et al., 2007; Paal & Bereczkei, 2007; Nettle & Liddle, 2008; Sylwester et al., 2012). 
The IMT involves stories which are read aloud to participants, followed by a series of true-or-false or forced-choice 
mentalising questions, designed to test participants’ understanding of the levels of recursive mindreading involved. 
Control questions are designed to test participants’ ability to remember details of the stories that are unrelated to 
mental states, but which contain a matched number of elements to be remembered. We analysed the stimuli used in 
the IMT3 and identified five main problems that, collectively, are significant enough to cast doubt on the conclusions 
drawn in these studies regarding the extent of human recursive mindreading ability. We describe these issues in the 
following paragraphs. A full breakdown of which of these criticisms apply to which questions in the IMT is 
provided as Supplementary Information. 
 Broken conceptual chains. In some cases, mental questions are constructed in a way that allowed them to 
be processed in ‘chunks’, rather than as a single metarepresentational unit. For example, the following sentence is 
intended to test fourth level mindreading: ‘Simon imagined1 that Betty wanted2 to marry Edward but that Edward 
                                                          
2 Although based on the IMT, some of the later studies do not use the name IMT. Here, we use IMT to refer to all 
studies based on the same general idea, and set of questions used. 
3 With one exception, none of the currently published studies that we are aware of provide a complete list of the 
specific questions used. The exception (Liddle & Nettle, 2006) used a version modified for children. We therefore 
analysed the complete set of IMT questions sent to us by R. Dunbar. This set of questions is an updated version of 
the materials used in the earliest IMT studies, and forms the basis for the materials used in later studies. As such, the 
items we analysed are representative of the stimuli used in this literature. 
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really wanted3 to marry Susan, whom Jim would like4 to have married’ (here and elsewhere in this paragraph, we 
have omitted the participant’s own mental state, which, if we had included it, would have had the subscript 0 (i.e. 
‘The participant believes0 that Simon imagined1…’)). However, this sentence does not contain one continuous chain 
of mental representations. Rather, it consists of three statements, joined by logical relationships: (i) Simon imagined1 
that Betty wanted2 to marry Edward; (ii) Simon imagined1 that Edward really wanted2 to marry Susan; and (iii) 
Simon imagined1 that Jim would like1 to have married Susan. Consequently, constructions of this sort do not test 4th 
level mindreading; they test the conjunction of multiple cases of 2nd level mindreading. 13 of 50 mental questions in 
the IMT are constructed like this. 
Simple substitution. Some stimuli are constructed in such a way that the entire sentence did not need to be 
processed in order to be answered correctly. An example is the forced choice between ‘The girl whose car Simon 
works on practices dance with the person who is a loan officer in Edward’s bank’ and ‘The girl whose car Simon 
works on practices dance with the person who is a computer consultant in Edward’s bank’ (from Rutherford, 2004). 
The only difference here is between ‘loan officer’ and ‘computer consultant’. In many cases, one of these 
alternatives simply did not appear in the story at all. As such, the question can be answered by simply spotting the 
unfamiliar item: the full sentences, and the complex propositions they convey, do not need to be understood. This 
occurs in 6 of 50 control questions, and 1 of 50 mental questions. 
 Impossible choices. Some questions in the IMT cannot be answered based on the information included in 
the story, or based on reasonable inference from the story. For example, in one story we are told that: Henry gave 
Sam faulty information; that Henry is a prankster, and Sam suspects him of playing a trick; and that their colleague 
Pete does not think Henry was trying to trick Sam. Crucially, however, Henry’s actual motivations (rather than just 
Sam’s suspicions about them) are never mentioned, and cannot be reasonably inferred. Nevertheless, one true/false 
question was the statement ‘Henry wanted to play a trick’. 7 of 50 mental questions and 2 of 50 control questions 
were impossible to answer in this way. 
 Syntactic complexity. The mentalising questions in the IMT are more syntactically recursive than the 
corresponding control questions. To measure this, we counted the number of embedded clauses in each of the 
questions (e.g. subordinate clauses such as “Susan wants to marry Edward” in the sentence “Jim thinks that Susan 
wants to marry Edward”). We found that the average number of embedded clauses was significantly higher in the 
mentalising questions than the control questions (Median level of embedding for control questions: 0; median for 
 6 
mental questions: 2; Mann-Whitney U Test, p<.001). This difference in syntactic complexity is not an issue for 
studies that use control questions only as a way to test participants’ comprehension of the stories. However it is an 
issue if these controls are used as an experimental contrast with mental questions, as some IMT studies have done. 
For instance, neuroimaging studies use the control questions as a baseline task (e.g. Powell et al., 2010; Lewis et al., 
2011). Consequently, it is possible that any differences in the brain regions associated with the two conditions may 
be due to the additional syntactic demands of the mental questions, rather than to mindreading specifically. 
 Inappropriate control questions. Finally, the control questions used in the IMT are arguably not 
appropriate controls in the first place, since they do not involve conceptual embedding. Recursion is the repetition of 
a given feature, with each repetition embedded inside a previous instance of that feature (Karlsson, 2009). In a 
linguistic context, this would involve the embedding of a phrase within a similar phrase, for example: 
[NP The book [PP on [NP the desk [PP in [NP the corner [PP of [NP  the room]]]]]]] 
This sentence involves a noun phrase (NP) ‘the room’ embedded within a prepositional phrase (PP) ‘of the room’ 
embedded within a larger NP ‘the corner of the room’, embedded within a larger PP, and so on. The syntax is 
recursive, and the concept itself is also recursive: each location is contained within another location. However, 
although syntactic recursion is often used to express conceptually recursive concepts, such as possession, recursive 
locations, or mental metarepresentations (e.g. “Jake thinks that I believe that Mary feels sad”), it is possible to 
express conceptual recursion without heavy syntactic recursion, through parataxis. For instance, the syntactically 
and conceptually recursive “Portia’s dog Fido’s ball” can also be expressed as “Portia has a dog. That dog is called 
Fido. Fido has a ball”, which is conceptually but not syntactically recursive. As such, an appropriate control for 
recursive mindreading, which is conceptually recursive, would be to use control questions that are also conceptually 
recursive, while controlling for syntactic recursion across both types of question. However, control questions in the 
IMT do not contain the same level of syntactic recursion as mental questions (see ‘Syntactic complexity’, above). 
Mental questions also do not use recursive concepts in a controlled manner (see ‘Broken conceptual chains’, above). 
Instead, the mental questions in the IMT are more recursive than the control questions, both syntactically and 
conceptually. 
 Summary. Although there have been consistent findings across different studies that use the IMT, pointing 
perhaps to its internal consistency, when taken as a whole the problems discussed above cast some doubt on its 
validity as a measure of recursive mindreading ability. Partly in light of this, and partly because we wished to use 
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implicit as well as explicit tasks (as detailed above, the IMT uses explicit questions only), we developed new stimuli 
for our study. 
 
The current study 
Our new study was designed to address the following questions: (i) Does the step-change in performance 
after four levels of metarepresentation reported in previous studies still occur with different stimuli, which avoid the 
issues identified above?; (ii) If not, does performance decline gradually, or not at all?; and (iii) Is any effect specific 
to implicit mindreading tasks, or does it generalize to non-mindreading tasks and/or explicit tasks, which have less 
ecological validity than implicit tasks? 
 
Methods 
Participants. We recruited 66 participants (41F, 25M; average age 22y 10m). All participants were 
recruited from the student population of the University of Edinburgh, through the University Careers Service 
Student and Graduate Employment online database, and paid £7 for their participation. Participants were screened to 
ensure that they (1) were native English speakers, and (2) did not know any of the actors in the stories. 
Materials. We wrote four original stories, each of which had a plot involving seven levels of recursively-
embedded mental representation, and seven levels of a non-mental recursive concept, such as possession. The stories 
were written in two different formats: as scripts, to be acted; and as a narrative, to be read by a single story-teller. 
All details of plot, character, and so on were identical in both formats; only the manner of presentation differed. The 
scripts were then performed by actors (implicit story presentation) and filmed; the narrative was read out by a single 
story-teller and filmed (explicit story presentation). We also created, for each of the levels of mental and non-mental 
recursion, two scenes to follow the main story. One of these scenes was consistent with the relevant mental / non-
mental aspect of the story, the other not. Again, these additional scenes were filmed both as scripts performed by 
actors (implicit test question presentation), and as narratives read by a single story-teller (explicit test question 
presentation). This gave a total of 14 test questions for each story (7 levels of recursion, each in mental and control 
conditions). 
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These stimuli were designed to avoid each of the problems identified in the previous section. First, we did 
not use any broken conceptual chains. Second, we took a number of steps to ensure that simple substitution was not 
possible, despite minimal differences between correct and incorrect answers in our explicit stimuli (see below). 
Third, the only differences between correct and incorrect stimuli involved differences in mental state attribution (e.g. 
‘wants’ vs. ‘doesn’t want’), rather than other aspects of the scenario (e.g. ‘loan officer’ vs. ‘computer consultant’), 
thus ensuring that there was no confound of syntactic complexity. Fourth, we ensured that there were no impossible 
choices. Fifth, we used control questions that had the same levels of conceptual and syntactic recursion as our 
experimental questions. 
Collectively, these aspects of our stimuli ensured that the two options could only be differentiated if 
participants had correctly understood the embedded levels of recursive mindreading involved. In particular, non-
mindreading strategies based on forms of simple substitutions should not succeed at better than chance levels, and in 
any case are not possible for implicit questions. More specifically, while the correct and incorrect choices in the 
explicit stimuli were very similar to one another, the differences they did have were precisely and only those that 
involved recursive mindreading. For example, one 4th-level mental question involved the choice between ‘Stephen 
knows that Elaine knows that Bernard feels she doesn’t know him well enough to date’ and ‘Stephen doesn’t know 
that Elaine knows that Bernard feels she doesn’t know him well enough to date’. The only difference here is in the 
first intentional verb (‘Stephen knows…’ vs. ‘Stephen doesn’t know…’). This means that in order to answer the 
question correctly, participants must parse everything that follows this verb – which in itself involves interpreting a 
three levels of mental metarepresentation – and then determine whether this is something that Stephen knows or not 
(a fourth level mental metarepresentation). Similarly, if correct and incorrect stimuli were also different at other 
points in the construction (e.g. ‘Stephen knows that Elaine knows that Bernard feels she doesn’t know him well 
enough to date’ and ‘Stephen doesn’t know that Elaine doesn’t know that Bernard feels she doesn’t know him well 
enough to date’), then participants need only parse what follows those differences (i.e. they need only know if Elaine 
does or doesn’t know that Bernard feels she doesn’t know him well enough to date), and nothing before that. In 
short, our stimuli were designed to ensure that participants had to parse and comprehend the whole scenario in order 
to perform at above chance levels. 
 9 
One of our stories is provided in the Appendix, in both narrative and script forms, with a complete set of 
questions for each. The full set of all four stories is provided as Supplementary Information, and the videos 
themselves are available at http://hdl.handle.net/10283/609. 
Design. Each participant viewed and was tested on all four stories, with manner of story presentation and 
test question presentation fully crossed within subjects (i.e. participants saw one story with implicit presentation of 
the story and implicit testing, one with explicit story presentation and implicit testing, and so on), in a fully counter-
balanced design, such that each story appeared in each position (1st viewed, 2nd viewed, etc.) an equal number of 
times, and each story appeared before and after each other story an equal number of times. 
 Procedure. Participants were first presented with the story video. They were able to watch this as many 
times as they liked before proceeding to the questions, after which they could not watch the story again (this mimics, 
in a different modality, the procedure used in several previous IMT tasks, in which participants read stories on 
paper). The fourteen test questions for each story (7 mental, 7 control) were presented in random order. For each 
question, two video frames were shown on the screen simultaneously, presenting the two forced choice options for 
that question, with left/right presentation randomized. Participants were able to watch both videos as many times as 
they liked (again, this mimics procedures from previous research), until they wished to identify, by mouse click, the 
video which they thought was consistent with the story. After each selection, participants were asked to rate their 
confidence, on a scale of 1 (lowest) to 10 (highest), that they had chosen the correct answer. After making a 
selection, participants were not able to return to that question. 
Data analysis. Data for a single story from three participants could not be used due to computer error. We 
analysed three dependent variables: success (i.e. identifying the correct video) on test; the confidence ratings that 
participants attached to those responses; and the number of times that participants viewed each question video 
before answering (which may index whether participants found certain types of questions more difficult than others, 
and had re-watch them in order to answer). For the statistical analysis, multilevel models with random effects were 
employed: responses were fitted to a binomial distribution for the binary success DV, and a Poisson distribution for 
the confidence rating and number of additional video views DVs4. Analyses were conducted in the R programming 
environment (version 3.1.1, R Core Team, 2013) using the lme4 package  (version 1.1-7; Bates et al., 2014). Lme4 
                                                          
4 As confidence ratings were generally towards the upper end of the 1 to 10 scale, confidence measures were 
subtracted from 10, in order to avoid predictions outside the possible range. Note that this reverses the expected sign 
of the coefficient estimates in the models for confidence. 
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was used at default settings, except for the usage of the `bobyqa'-optimizer and increasing the maximum iterations to 
100,000. The theoretically-motivated factors Level of Question Complexity (1-7, indicating required level of 
metarepresentation), Condition (Mental or Control), Story Presentation (Implicit or Explicit) and Question 
Presentation (Implicit or Explicit) were included as fixed effects for all DVs. Additionally, we included Number of 
Additional Story Views (i.e. beyond the first, obligatory viewing of the story) as a predictor, in order to control for 
the effects this might have on performance. Following Barr et al. (2013) we used a maximum random effects model, 
and consequently included Subject (64 levels) and Story (4 levels) as random effects, with by-Subject and by-Story 
random intercepts and random slopes for Level, Question Type, Story Presentation and Question Presentation, 
which represented the most complex converging model. For further analyses, we reduced the random effects 
structure further, if the models did not converge. The validity of the mixed effects analyses were assessed by 
computing likelihood ratio tests comparing models containing effects with null models that contained the intercept 
and the random effect structure only (c.f. Mundry, 2011). Due to the nature of multilevel analysis, F-ratios will not 
be reported. 
 
Results 
Success rates. The model predicting success did significantly better than the null model (χ2(15)=28.244, 
p=.02), and showed slight underdispersion (dispersion parameter of 0.771). Overall success rates for all questions 
were well above the level expected under chance performance (intercept in log-odds space of 2.356, corresponding 
to odds of greater than 10:1 of answering correctly, i.e. answering around 90% of all questions correctly). Moreover, 
there was very little evidence of any effect of Level or Condition on success (Level: β=-0.037, SE=0.055, p=.494; 
Condition: β=0.092, SE=0.329, p=.779; see Figure 1), nor of any interaction between these two factors (β=-0.073, 
SE=0.066, p=.266).  
 [figure 1 about here] 
There were two significant interactions between predictors of accuracy (Figure 2). First, there was an 
interaction between Condition and Story Presentation (β=0.727, SE=0.282, p=.01). Post-hoc tests using dummy-
coded data and taking Control-Explicit Story as the baseline showed that only the Mental-Explicit combination (i.e. 
the combination investigated in the IMT) performed worse than baseline (Mental-Explicit: β=-0.366, SE=0.173, 
p=.034; Control-Implicit: β=-0.526, SE=0.391, p=.179; Mental-Implicit: β=-0.067, SE=0.398, p=.866).   
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Second, there was an interaction between Story Presentation and Question Presentation (β=0.885, 
SE=0.304, p<.001). Post-hoc tests revealed no difference between the two modes of question presentation for 
Explicitly-presented stories (β=0.089, SE=0.603, p=.883), but for Implicitly-presented stories performance was 
significantly worse if the questions were presented Explicitly (β=0.767, SE=0.364, p=.035). In other words, an 
implicit story followed by an explicit question was the most difficult combination of Story Presentation and 
Question Presentations. All other main effects and interactions were not significant. (p>.204). 
Finally, additional views of the story videos lead to a significant improvement in success (significant effect 
of Number of Additional Story Views: β=0.457, SE=0.138, p <.001). While the inclusion of Number of Additional 
Story Views as a factor does improve model fit significantly (χ2(1)=11.312, p<.001), a model lacking Number of 
Additional Story Views as a factor produced qualitatively similar results to those outlined above.  
In summary, participants were able to successfully process recursive mental concepts even at high levels of 
recursion, and this was no more difficult than other, non-mental recursive concepts. 
[figure 2 about here] 
Judgements of confidence. For the confidence data the fitted model did significantly better than the null 
model (χ2(15)=275.87, p<.001), and had a dispersion parameter of 1.356 suggesting overdispersion within the 
acceptable range. Further analysis of confidence ratings revealed several effects of our manipulations. There was a 
small but significant effect of Level (β=0.106, SE=0.022, p<.001; see Figure 3): participants’ confidence dropped as 
the levels increased even though, as noted above, their actual level of accuracy remained high. There were also a 
number of significant two- and three-way interactions involving Level. Confidence ratings for Mental but not 
Control questions decrease with level (main model reveals a significant Level x Condition interaction, β=0.058, 
SE=0.012, p<.001; post-hoc tests using multilevel models on subsets of the data show a significant effect of Level 
for Mental questions, β= 0.070, SE=0.0546, p=.009, but not for Control questions, β=0.045, SE=0.030, p=.134). 
This interaction is further modulated by both Story Presentation and Question Presentation (Level x Condition x 
Story Presentation interaction: β=0.076, SE=0.024, p=.001; Level x Condition x Question Presentation interaction: 
β=-0.136, SE=0.024, p<.001). Post-hoc tests on Control questions reveal no two-way interactions between Level 
and Story Presentation ((β=-0.016, SE=0.017, p=.325) or Level and Question Presentation (β=0.020, SE=0.016, 
p=.206): however, these two-way interactions are significant for Mental questions (Level x Story Presentation: 
β=0.082, SE=0.019, p<.001; Level x Question Presentation: β=-0.116, SE=0.018, p<.001): confidence on Mental 
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questions decreases faster with increasing Level when the story is presented Implicitly, or when the questions are 
presented Explicitly. Finally, there was also a three-way interaction between Condition, Story Presentation and 
Question Presentation (β=0.358, SE=0.098, p<.001). Post-hoc tests using dummy-coded data and taking Explicit 
Story-Explicit Question as the baseline showed that for Control questions, participants had significantly lower 
confidence for the Implicit Story-Explicit Question combination (β=0.464, SE=0.164, p=.005), with Implicit Story-
Implicit Question (β=0.104, SE=0.270, p=.700) and Explicit Story-Implicit Question (β=0.281, SE=0.201, p=.125) 
not significantly different  from the Explicit Story-Explicit Question intercept (β=0.438, SE=0.146, p<.001); in 
contrast, for Mental questions, participants had higher confidence for the Implicit Story-Implicit Question 
combination than for Explicit Story-Explicit Question (β=-0.537, SE=0.179, p=.003; other comparisons n.s., 
p>.137). 
Finally, while there was a tendency for participants’ confidence rating to increase with Number of 
Additional Story Views, this effect was not significant (β=-0.086, SE=0.049, p=0.079). Furthermore, including this 
factor did not significantly improve model fit (χ2(1)=2.253, p=.133) over an equivalent model lacking this factor, 
and the simpler model yielded qualitatively similar results to those discussed above  
[figure 3 about here] 
Number of additional video views. The third dependent variable was the number of times each question 
video was viewed. The fitted model did significantly better than the null model (χ2(15)=172.52, p<.001) and had a 
dispersion parameter of 1.095, suggesting low overdispersion within the acceptable range. 
This model revealed a small but significant effect of Level (β=0.169, SE=0.016, p<.001): participants’ 
required additional views of the question videos as levels increased. There were also significant effects of Condition 
(β=-0.272, SE=0.075, p<.001: mental questions required fewer additional plays) and Question Presentation (β=-
0.473, SE=0.086, p<.001: implicitly-presented questions required fewer additional plays), and various two-way 
interactions involving Level, Condition, and Question Presentation. Ultimately these are best explained by 
considering the significant three-way interaction between Level, Question Presentation and Condition (β=-0.171, 
SE=0.054, p=.001; see Figure 4). Post-hoc tests on subsets of the data show that the number of times the question 
videos were viewed increased with Level for Explicit questions (there were strong effects of Level in Explicit-
Control and Explicit-Mental conditions: Explicit-Control, β=0.207, SE=0.030, p<.001; Explicit-Mental, β=0.278, 
SE=0.038, p<.001) and for Implicit-Control questions (β=0.131, SE=0.057, p=0.022), but not for Implicit-Mental 
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questions (β=0.056, SE=0.100, p=.577), which showed no significant increase in additional question viewings with 
increasing complexity. 
[figure 4 about here] 
There was also a significant interaction between Story Presentation and Question Presentation (β=-0.404, 
SE=0.121, p < .001). Follow-up analyses using dummy coded data with Explicit Story - Explicit Questions as the 
baseline revealed that, compared to this baseline, combinations of Implicit Story - Implicit Questions required 
significantly fewer views before answering (β=-0.539, SE=0.129, p < .001), as did Explicit Stories – Implicit 
Question combinations (β=-0.397, SE=0.122, p = .001). Implicit Story – Explicit Question combinations required 
more views than baseline before answering, albeit not significantly so (β=0.170, SE=0.113, p = .131). 
 Finally, while there was a tendency for participants’ to require fewer views of the question videos if they 
had watched the stories more often, this effect was not significant (β=-0.042, SE=0.075, p=0.574). Furthermore, 
including this factor did not significantly improve model fit (χ2(1)=0.306, p=.580) over an equivalent model lacking 
this factor, and the simpler model yielded qualitatively similar results to those discussed above. 
 
Discussion 
Our study produced several results worthy of note, of which two are of particular importance. 
First, performance on mindreading tasks was high throughout (see Figure 1). The design of our stimuli 
ensured that this level of performance could not be due to guesswork or any other strategy that did not involve 
recursive mindreading (see Methods). These findings run counter to the intuition that high level recursive 
mindreading tasks are cognitively demanding, and counter to results obtained in previous research that suggest that 
performance on mental questions decrease markedly after level 5. One way to understand this result is by analogy 
with our perceptual skills: a formal description of what is involved in, say, vision, is complex, but this does not 
mean that seeing is a cognitively demanding activity, beyond the ken of typical human abilities. Our results suggest 
that the same may be true of recursive mindreading, even at high levels of recursion. Interestingly, the apparently 
mistaken intuition that high levels of recursive mindreading are particularly cognitively demanding extends even to 
the individuals involved: while actual performance remained high across all levels, confidence levels declined as 
level of embedding increased, for Mental questions but not Control questions (see Figure 3). 
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Second, we found that participants viewed the videos more often as the level of complexity increased – 
except for implicitly presented, mental questions i.e. except in those contexts that are most ecologically valid (see 
Figure 4). This tentatively suggests that recursive mindreading is especially easy when employed within its natural 
environment, and that it is otherwise no more or less easy than recursive tasks in general. As we emphasised in the 
Introduction, humans’ natural ecology is social. Correspondingly, prominent accounts of the evolution of human 
cognition emphasise the importance of specifically social cognition, including mental state attribution (Tooby & 
Cosmides, 1992; Sterelny, 2003; Tomasello, 2014). Our results make sense from this ecological perspective: 
recursive mindreading is an essential, ubiquitous, and adaptive component of everyday life, and as such, we should 
expect that we are good at it. A natural extension of our study, which would increase the ecological validity, would 
be to limit the participants to single views of both the story and the question videos (rather than the multiple views 
that, following previous research, we allowed for in the current design). 
These results are consistent with the picture emerging from the literature on adult first-level mindreading, 
which shows that mindreading may be less like thinking, and more like perception i.e. something that we do 
unconsciously, as part of the background cognition that manages much of our daily lives (Apperly, 2011). Several 
experiments have now shown that in implicit contexts, we track the beliefs of others automatically, as part of our 
intuitive monitoring of the world around us, and that like our perceptual experiences, these representations of others’ 
mental states fade quickly if we do not focus on them (e.g. Kovács et al., 2010; Samson et al., 2010; van der Wel et 
al., 2014). Our results tentatively suggest that the same may be true of recursive mindreading. In particular, we 
found that although participants in general increased their number of views of the question videos as level increased, 
suggesting an increase in the level of difficulty, this was not true of implicit mental questions. 
 It is also instructive to compare our results with the developmental literature. First, note that the classic 
Sally-Anne false belief task uses an implicit story (acted out using dolls, albeit with explicit commentary attached), 
followed by an explicit question. Our results show that this implicit-explicit combination is the most challenging 
combination for adults in recursive mindreading tasks (see Figure 2). The exact reasons why this should be the case 
are a topic for future research, but whatever the reason, this finding raises the possibility that the classic false belief 
task involves the most cognitively demanding combination of story and question presentation possible. More 
generally, our results suggest two possible lines of future research on the development of mindreading abilities: (i) 
the use of explicit-explicit and/or explicit-implicit methods, in order to make comparisons with the existing implicit-
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explicit and implicit-implicit approaches; and (ii) the investigation of higher-level, recursive mindreading abilities in 
children, using implicit-implicit methods. Implicit-implicit methods have dramatically re-shaped our understanding 
of the development of simple mindreading abilities, but this advance has not yet been extended to the development 
of recursive mindreading abilities. 
These results differ somewhat from previous research on adult recursive mindreading, which found a 
prominent drop in performance after four levels of metarepresentation. We suggest two possible reasons for this. 
The ecological validity of our implicit tasks cannot fully explain this, since we also find high levels of performance 
on explicit tasks. A more likely explanation is the various methodological problems we have identified with the 
IMT, which previous studies used as a measure of mindreading ability (see Problems with previous research, 
above). These methodological problems raise the possibility that previous results may not accurately reflect human 
mindreading abilities, and their relationship to other aspects of social psychology, as accurately as possible. Further 
investigation into the exact reasons for the differences between our study and previous research may be warranted. 
The broader implications of our findings are several. In particular, our results should reduce concerns that 
some theoretical explanations of many important human behaviours and institutions are implausible precisely 
because they invoke high level recursive mindreading abilities. For example, the most prominent theoretical 
accounts of human communication argue that it involves the expression, on the part of the speaker, of an intention 
that the audience recognises that the speaker has an intention to inform the audience – and that the audience must 
recognise these embedded intentions (Grice, 1969; Sperber, 2000b; Tomasello, 2008; Csibra, 2010). Several 
researchers have argued that, while theoretically cogent, this analysis is empirically implausible, precisely because it 
depends upon high levels of recursive mindreading, which are assumed to be cognitively demanding (e.g. Gómez, 
1994; Clark, 1996; Glüer & Pagin, 2003; Breheny, 2006). Our results suggest that these concerns are likely 
unfounded: at least in the contexts we explored here, recursive mindreading poses no particular challenges for adult 
humans, even at high levels of embedding. The same point applies to numerous other activities that have been 
argued to depend upon recursive mindreading, such as language, story-telling, culture, and even consciousness 
(Sperber, 2000a, Dunbar, 2003; 2005; 2008; Corballis, 2011; Graziano, 2013). 
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Figure Legends 
 
Figure 1: Mean proportion correct (by participant) at each level of mindreading. Error bars give 95% CIs. These 
data show that performance on both mental and control tasks does not decrease as the level of embedding increases. 
 
Figure 2: The Condition x Story Presentation (left) and Story Presentation x Question Presentation (right) 
interactions for accuracy. Bars give means of the by-participant mean success rates, error bars indicate 95% CIs. 
These results show that for control questions, performance was lower when the stories were presented implicitly 
rather than explicitly (left-hand side), and that performance was reduced when stories were presented implicitly and 
questions explicitly, in comparison to all other possible combinations of story presentation and questions 
presentation (right-hand side). These were the only significant interactions for accuracy. 
 
Figure 3: Mean confidence (by participant). Error bars give 95% CIs. These data show that although actual 
performance (i.e. accuracy) does not decrease as the level of embedding increases (see Figure 1), our participants’ 
confidence in their answers does decrease. 
 
Figure 4: Number of additional video views for each combination of condition and question presentation. Error bars 
give 95% CIs. These results show that for all control questions (i.e. both implicit and explicit), and for mental 
questions that were presented explicitly, participants chose to watch the videos increasingly often as level increased. 
This was, however, not true for mental questions presented implicitly, for which there was no corresponding 
increase with level. Given that this reduction in the number of views did not lead to any reduction in actual 
performance (see Figures 1 and 2), this is tentative evidence that the implicit mental questions were processed more 
easily than all other types of question. In the Discussion we suggest that this may be because recursive mindreading 
is actually easy, when presented within is natural social context. 
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Appendix: Example script & narrative (story: ‘Bernard’) 
 
Narrated version 
 One evening, Megan finds out that her sister Lauren wants to go out with a boy in her Biology class, 
Stephen. Megan tells Lauren that Stephen used to be best friends with a boy called Chris, who is now Megan’s best 
friend. Lauren tells Megan that she saw Stephen smiling and flirting with their cousin, Elaine, and so she thinks 
Stephen might want to go out with Elaine. Because Lauren thinks Stephen likes someone else, she is too nervous to 
ask him out. 
 Megan talks to Elaine at school and finds out that Elaine actually wants to go out with Bernard, whom 
Megan knows from the school play. Megan learns that Elaine and Bernard are next-door neighbours, and that 
Bernard thinks that Elaine doesn’t know him well enough to date. Elaine tells Megan that Stephen knows how Elaine 
feels about Bernard and how Bernard feels about Elaine.  
 Megan later talks to her friend Chris about the situation, realising that if Lauren knew about Elaine’s 
situation, and knew that Stephen knows about it too, Lauren would realise that Stephen doesn’t want to go out with 
Elaine, and might work up the courage to ask him out. Megan plans to tell Lauren about everything that evening. 
 
Mental questions for narrated version 
1. A.  Elaine likes Bernard 
 B. Elaine likes Stephen 
2. A. Megan knows that Lauren wants to ask Stephen out 
 B. Megan doesn’t know that Lauren wants to ask Stephen out 
3. A. Elaine doesn’t know that Bernard feels that she doesn’t know him well enough to 
  date 
 B. Elaine knows that Bernard feels that she doesn’t know him well enough to date 
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4. A. Stephen knows that Elaine knows that Bernard feels she doesn’t know him well    
  enough to date 
 B. Stephen doesn’t know that Elaine knows that Bernard feels she doesn’t know him   
  well enough to date 
5. A. Megan knows that Stephen doesn’t know that Elaine knows that Bernard feels    
  that she doesn’t know him well enough to date 
 B. Megan knows that Stephen knows that Elaine knows that Bernard feels that she    
  doesn’t know him well enough to date 
6. A. Chris knows that Megan knows that Stephen knows that Elaine knows that    
  Bernard feels that she doesn’t know him well enough to date 
 B. Chris doesn’t know that Megan knows that Stephen knows that Elaine knows that   
  Bernard feels that she doesn’t know him well enough to date 
7. A. Megan wants Lauren to know that she, Megan, knows that Stephen knows that    
  Elaine knows that Bernard feels she doesn’t know him well enough to date, so    
  that Lauren asks Stephen out 
 B. Megan doesn’t want Lauren to know that she, Megan, knows that Stephen knows   
  that Elaine knows that Bernard feels she doesn’t know him well enough to date,    
  so that Lauren doesn’t ask Stephen out 
 
Control questions for narrated version 
1. A. Lauren is Megan’s sister 
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 B. Lauren is Megan’s friend 
2. A. Stephen has Biology with Megan’s sister Lauren 
 B. Stephen was in the school play with Megan’s friend Chris 
3. A. Chris used to be best friends with Stephen, who has Biology with Megan’s sister 
 B. Chris used to be best friends with Bernard, who acted in the school play with    
  Megan’s sister 
4. A. Megan is best friends with Chris, who used to be best friends with Stephen, who  
 has Biology with Megan’s sister Lauren 
 B. Megan’s sister Lauren used to go out with Chris, who is best friends with Elaine,   
  who has Biology with Stephen 
5. A. Bernard acted in the play with Megan, who is the best friend of Chris, who used    
  to be best friends with Stephen, who takes Biology with Lauren who is Megan’s    
  sister 
 B. Bernard acted in the play with Lauren, who used to go out with Chris, who used    
  to be best friends with Stephen, who lives next door to Elaine who is Lauren’s    
  cousin 
6. A. Elaine lives next door to Bernard, who acted in the play with Megan, who is the    
  best friend of Chris, who used to be best friends with Stephen, who takes Biology   
  with Lauren, who is Megan’s sister 
 B. Elaine lives next door to Bernard, who is the best friend of Chris, who used to be   
  best friends with Stephen, who was in the play with Lauren’s sister Megan, who    
  has Biology with Elaine 
 24 
7. A. Megan’s cousin is Elaine, who lives next door to Bernard, who acted in the play    
  with Megan, who is the best friend of Chris, who used to be best friends with    
  Stephen, who has Biology with Megan’s sister Lauren 
 B. Megan’s cousin is Elaine, who has Biology with Bernard, who acted in the play    
  with Stephen, who used to go out with Megan, who is the best friend of Chris,    
  who has Biology with Megan’s sister Lauren 
 
Scripted version 
Scene 1 
Megan: Lauren, your phone just buzzed. 
Lauren snatches up her phone 
Megan: Ooooh, is that a booooy? 
Lauren: Maybe...OK, OK, it’s Stephen. You know, the one in my Biology class. 
Megan: Oh, I didn’t know you had a thing for him. Did you know he used to be best friends with Chris? 
Lauren: Which Chris? 
Megan: The Chris who’s my best friend. Yeah, they were friends in primary school. 
Lauren: That’s weird. Anyway...I was actually thinking about working up the guts to ask him out, but I’m nervous. 
Megan: Haha, you’d better not let our Dad find out...Anyway, why are you nervous? I’m sure he’ll say yes. 
Lauren: Well, I saw him chatting to Elaine at lunchtime the other day, and he was all smiley and flirty, so I think 
he’s planning to ask her out. 
Scene 2 
Megan: Hey Elaine! 
Elaine: Oh, hey cousin, could you hold this for a second? 
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Megan: So, I saw you flirting with Stephen the other day...he’s cute! 
Stephen walks past them, they pause awkwardly and giggle 
Elaine: Haha, yup, he is, but there’s nothing going on. 
Megan: Why not? 
Elaine: I kind of have a thing for Bernard... 
Megan: Bernard? The one who was in the school play with me? 
Elaine: Yeah, that’s the one. 
Megan: Oh, I didn’t know you guys knew each other. 
Elaine: I live next door to him. Anyway, he doesn’t like me back. 
Megan: Why on earth not? 
Elaine: Well, I dunno if it’s that he doesn’t like me, it’s more just that he thinks I don’t know him well enough to 
really want to date him. He says if I knew him better I wouldn’t want to... really weird. 
Megan: Ugh, he’s just being melodramatic. I’m sure he’ll come round. Does Stephen know? He looked pretty into 
you when you were chatting. 
Elaine: Yup, I told him about it ages ago, we were just laughing about Mr Murray’s new haircut. 
Megan: Ah, OK. Anyway, I’d better run – hope Bernard realises what he’s missing! 
Scene 3 
Megan: ...so it turns out that Elaine and Stephen aren’t into each other at all. Elaine is actually really into Bernard. 
Chris: The acting one? 
Megan: Yeah. Bernard’s super melodramatic, too – he doesn’t want to date Elaine because he reckons Elaine 
doesn’t know him well enough or something. 
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Chris: That’s weird. And Stephen knows that Elaine’s not into him? 
Megan: Mm, Elaine told him about the whole Bernard thing ages ago. 
Chris: So Lauren... 
Megan: Right! So, Lauren doesn’t want to ask Stephen out because she thinks he’s into Elaine – but if she knew that 
Stephen knows that Elaine likes Bernard, and that Stephen knows that Elaine’s not into him, she might 
work up the guts to ask Stephen out. 
Chris: I guess...so are you going to tell her? 
Megan: Yeah, I’m going to tell her the whole thing tonight. 
 
Mental questions for scripted version 
1. A. Elaine:  Ahhh, there goes Bernard, he’s so cute...can’t remember the last   
   time I liked someone so much. 
 B. Elaine:  Ahhh, there goes Stephen, he’s so cute...can’t remember the last   
    time I liked someone so much. 
2. A. Chris:  I heard your sister wants to ask Stephen out! 
  Megan:  What? She hasn’t told me that! 
 B. Chris:  Lauren told me today that she wants to ask Stephen out. . 
  Megan:  Oh, yeah, she told me about it last night 
3. A. Elaine:  I worked up the guts to ask Bernard out today. He said no, but I   
    have no idea why he won’t go out with me 
 B. Elaine:  I worked up the guts to ask Bernard out today. He said no. He    
    reckons I don’t know him well enough 
4. A. Megan:  Hey, Stephen, I thought you should know something. 
  Stephen:  Yeah? 
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  Megan:  It’s about Elaine – you know she has a thing for Bernard? 
  Stephen:  Yeah, and he doesn’t want to go out with her because he thinks she   
    doesn’t know him enough? Poor girl, she was crushed when she   
    found out 
 B. Megan:  Oh, I have some hot gossip – did you hear about Elaine? 
  Stephen:  No – what about her? 
  Megan:  She’s really into Bernard, but Bernard doesn’t like her back    
    because he thinks Elaine doesn’t know him well enough. 
  Stephen:  Seriously? That’s a weird reason not to go out with someone. Why   
    didn’t Elaine tell me about this? 
5. A. Megan:  So Elaine told me today that she has a thing for Bernard, but    
    Bernard doesn’t like her back because he thinks Elaine doesn’t   
    know him well enough. 
  Chris:  Elaine has a thing for Bernard? But I saw her flirting with Stephen! 
Megan: Mm-hmm, and Stephen has no idea, either that Elaine likes Bernard, or that 
Bernard doesn’t like her back. 
  Chris:  Yikes, that’s not cool – she needs to tell him. 
 B. Megan:  So Elaine told me today that she has a thing for Bernard, but    
    Bernard doesn’t like her back because he thinks Elaine doesn’t   
    know him well enough. 
  Chris:  Elaine has a thing for Bernard? But I saw her flirting with Stephen! 
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  Megan:  Oh, yeah, he knows, she told him. 
  Chris:  Knows which bit? 
  Megan:  Knows that Elaine likes Bernard and that Bernard told Elaine that   
    he won’t go out with her. 
6. A. Chris:  Yeah, so Megan heard some juicy gossip today...Stephen too? 
Haha, I bet it’s the same gossip – they both know about this, anyway... So you 
know Elaine? She has a mega thing for Bernard... uh-huh... and Bernard told her 
– yeah, told Elaine – that he doesn’t want to go out with her because Elaine 
doesn’t know him well enough. I know, it’s weird, right? So, wait, you spoke to 
Megan earlier and asked her about Elaine and Stephen, and Megan said she 
didn’t know anything about it? That’s weird, she definitely knows. 
 B. Chris:  Yeah, so what’s this hot gossip? Elaine and Bernard? Why not? 
Because she doesn’t know him well enough? That’s weird...does  
 Stephen know? Ok, that’s good, it would be really awful of Elaine  
 if he didn’t. And Megan knows too? What? Has she heard that  
 Stephen knows about all of it? That’s weird, Megan didn’t tell me  
 anything. 
7. A. Megan:  So, I’m thinking that Lauren needs to know what I heard. Right?   
    Because if she knows what I know right now, about Elaine’s crush,   
    and Bernard’s rejection, and that Stephen knows the whole    
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    thing...she’ll work up the guts to ask him out! So I’m going to tell   
    her tonight. 
 B. Megan:  Well, if you think about, if Lauren knew what I heard today – and   
    if she knew that Stephen knew all about it too, about Elaine’s crush   
    and Bernard’s weird reason for rejection and everything – she’d   
    ask Stephen out. But I don’t want her to do that, so I’m not going   
    to tell her. 
 
Control questions for scripted version 
1. A. Megan: So I was chatting to my friend, Lauren…  
 B. Megan: So I was chatting to my sister, Lauren…  
2. A. Megan: You know Stephen? The one who has Biology with my sister     
   Lauren?  
 B. Megan: You know Stephen? The one who was in the school play with my    
   friend Chris?  
3. A. Megan: Did you know that Chris used to be best friends with Stephen?  
  Elaine: Which Stephen?  
  Megan: The one who has Biology with my sister Lauren.  
 B. Megan: Did you know that Chris used to be best friends with Bernard?  
  Elaine: Which Bernard?  
  Megan: The one who was in the school play with my sister Lauren.  
4. A. Megan: You know Stephen, who has Biology with my sister? He used to be    
   best friends with my best friend, Chris.  
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 B. Megan: You know my sister Lauren used to go out with Chris, who’s best    
   friends with Elaine? She has Biology with Stephen.  
5. A. Elaine: No, the other Megan, the one whose best friend Chris used to be    
   best friends with this guy Stephen who has Biology with Lauren,    
   Megan’s sister…yeah, she knows Bernard from the school play.  
 B. Elaine: No, the other Lauren, the one who used to go out with that Chris    
   guy who used to be best friends with Stephen…yeah, Stephen who    
   lives next door to me. Yup, that’s the Lauren who’s my cousin.  
6. A. Elaine: You know Bernard, who was in the play with Megan? No, the     
   Megan whose best friend is that Chris guy, the one who used to be    
   best friends with Stephen…nuh-uh, the other Stephen, the one who    
   has Biology with Megan’s sister Lauren. Yeah, that Megan.     
   Remember she co-starred with Bernard? That’s my next-door     
   neighbour.  
 B. Elaine: You know Bernard, Chris’s best friend? No, the Chris who used to    
   be best friends with Stephen, that guy who starred in the play with    
   Lauren’s sister Megan, who’s in Biology with us. Yeah, that     
   Bernard is my next-door neighbour.  
7. A. Megan: My cousin, Elaine, the one who lives next door to Bernard? Argh,    
   you know Bernard. He was in the play with me and my best friend    
   Chris…Chris who used to be best friends with Stephen, the guy in    
   Biology with my sister Lauren.  
B. Megan: You know my cousin Elaine, who has Biology with Bernard? 
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Argh, you know Bernard…he acted in the play with my ex, Stephen, and my best friend 
Chris…Chris who has lives next door to me and my sister Lauren.  
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